Global Economic and Political Situation – Economic and Political Situation in Greece – Labor Movement And The Left

OKDE May 2025

(A) The Global Economic and Political Situation

 

1.The tariff war unleashed by the Trump presidency has effectively closed the chapter of approximately 30 years of neoliberal “globalization.” As even the bourgeois strategists themselves describe it, this represents the greatest shock to the global economy in a century—i.e., since the major crisis of the interwar period (the long downturn from 1914 to 1945), which ultimately led to World War II. As the economists of banking giant JP Morgan put it: “Blood will be spilled.”

In the case of the U.S. economy, the overall tariff level is approaching the highest historical rate—around 26%.

 

2. Tariffs and other elements of Trump’s policy became apparent during his first term (2017–2021), if not even earlier, for instance under Obama and before him under George W. Bush.[1] They began to generalize and take on an explosive character after the milestone crisis of 2020 and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. This process—the fragmentation of the global economy—is now in full and stormy progress.

Thus, above all, the current policy of U.S. imperialism under Trump serves to confirm:

a) The failure of neoliberal “globalization” and the strategic choices of the Western imperialist powers;

b) The structural crisis of the system, with its explosive and convulsive character.

We are not merely witnessing an intensification of rivalries, a “paradigm shift,” a “reset” of the system, or a “multipolar restructuring” of it—though all these terms are partially accurate. What they often obscure is the essential fact: today’s developments are the result of the profound crisis of the capitalist/imperialist system. There is no smooth or technical solution to its contradictions, antagonisms, or rivalries. All bourgeois plans are headed down a path of colossal confrontations.

We are living in a turbulent moment of “transition from the old to the new,” where the end of the entire postwar world (at a minimum) is accelerating toward cataclysmic events—and the deadly threat of war expansion. This will define the global “landscape” in the coming years.

 

3. U.S. imperialism may well extract or impose certain initial economic or political victories. However, as we shall see, a full reversal of the course of events seems impossible or at the very least unimaginably difficult. The negotiations—or rather blackmail—surrounding tariffs are not “purely” economic issues (imports/exports, etc.) but primarily aim at severing the ties of various countries with China and striking strategically at its plans. This is made evident, for example:

a) With the seizure of the Panama Canal from Chinese control. Similar demands are being made by U.S. imperialism toward other countries. Notably, the U.S. is targeting Chinese company Cosco and its global control/ownership in ports, transport, etc.[2]

b) With the attempt to launch a broad offensive in the Middle East together with the Zionist killer state of Israel: extermination of the Palestinians, partition of Syria, attacks on the Houthis in Yemen, and open threats against Iran should it fail to fully surrender. The risk of war with Iran grows by the day. Settling this “unresolved matter” appears both necessary and urgent for U.S. imperialism—on the one hand, to “break” China’s New Silk Road trade route (with Iran as a critical hub), and on the other, to free up forces from the Middle East to pivot against China.

c) With preparations to open a front against China: around Taiwan, which is being pressured by the U.S. to ramp up military spending to a staggering 10% of its GDP; with attempts to split the BRICS and provoke open conflict between China and India over the Kashmir issue.[3] China’s stronger and more public reaction to tariffs this time—unlike its relatively restrained stance in earlier phases—shows how far the prospect of confrontation has escalated.

This pivot in Southeast Asia and the Pacific against China, naturally, comes with enormous difficulties and contradictions—especially as Russia’s victory in Ukraine raises doubts among America’s allies (and “allies”) in the region as to whether the U.S. can actually guarantee their security or whether they risk becoming “another Ukraine.”

However, the need of U.S. imperialism is so pressing that the opening of this front cannot be postponed indefinitely. In the next few years (and not many), we will witness many highly dangerous developments in that region.

 

4. Since the 1980s, when neoliberalism prevailed universally as the dominant ideology and policy of the global bourgeoisie, “globalization” subsequently accompanied and reinforced it as a central strategic choice of U.S. and EU imperialism from the early 1990s onward. For roughly two decades, we witnessed the peak of neoliberalism, along with its ideological myths and illusions—of a “global village,” of a “new economy” based almost entirely on stock markets and financial flows (a “virtual” economy, parasitism of fictitious capital), and high-tech sectors.

Especially after the epochal changes of 1989–1991, this period reflected:
a) A shift in global class relations, to a degree astonishingly favourable to Capital—perhaps uniquely so in the history of capitalism.[4]
b) The hopes of the ruling class (then also at its peak, and not entirely unfounded) that the necessary and sufficient conditions for capitalism’s exit from its structural crisis (the long downturn from the late 1960s to early 1970s) had finally been assembled.

Many of those necessary conditions were indeed present—heightened exploitation of labor, acceleration of commodity and money circulation, expansion of the global market, etc.—but they proved insufficient. The hopes or illusions of the bourgeoisie and imperialists were ultimately dashed, as were those of reformists and many Marxist-influenced or “progressive” thinkers.

 

5. The strategy of neoliberal “globalization” was the result of:
a) Capital’s inherent tendency toward concentration, centralization, and internationalization;[5]
b) The enormous geographical expansion of the global market following the collapse of the USSR, the regimes of “existing socialism” in Eastern Europe, and changes in other countries formerly influenced by the USSR, including China.

This was perhaps the greatest such expansion in capitalist history. It opened up, at least for a time, enormous opportunities for the imperialists of the U.S. and EU to intensify their overexploitation and control of the economies of dependent countries—via privatizations, rock-bottom raw material prices, and more.

Of course, also through the reduction of tariffs in favor of U.S. and EU imperialists, who at that time were passionate advocates of “free movement of goods and capital” (whereas today they raise tariff and protectionist walls everywhere)—always, of course, in a one-sided manner to benefit themselves, so as to “open up” and plunder the economies of dependent and weaker countries.

According to their initial assessments—or as it initially appeared—they would succeed in perpetuating their productive advantages over dependent countries. Along with these, they sought:

1.                  To transfer large portions of the production activities of imperialist multinationals to countries/regions with cheap, abundant labor (e.g., China).

2.                  To maintain dominance in international trade, utilizing the mechanism of unequal exchange—i.e., absorbing surplus value produced in dependent countries through their superior productivity.[6]

3.                  To preserve their near-total monopoly over global credit.

4.                  To assert the dominant role of their currencies, above all the hegemony of the U.S. dollar.

5.                  To maintain the postwar “architecture” of the global economy through the control of the IMF and World Bank, in which they (and especially U.S. imperialism) held virtually exclusive and always decisive influence.

These plans naturally included the subordination of China to an inferior role. China was “integrated” into “globalization” on this very basis, from the perspective of the U.S. and EU imperialists.[7]

 

6. The outcomes of neoliberal “globalization” were profound—even if, in the end, it was not enough to pull the system out of crisis (the crisis proved far greater than the successes of the capitalists/imperialists). For about 20 years, the “liberalization” of commodity and capital flows mitigated the immediate effects of the crisis and boosted capitalist profitability—especially that of various fictitious and parasitic forms of capital: debt, stock markets, financial “products” like derivatives, etc.

It deepened the internationalization of capital and the productive forces—thus the interweaving and interdependence of various parts of the world economy (e.g., via “supply chains”), despite their structural unevenness and heterogeneity. Clearly, as China’s rise has emphatically demonstrated (as well as that of other “emerging” countries), globalization intensified the phenomena of uneven and combined development. It shifted the economic center of gravity eastward, to Asia—at the expense of the older imperialist powers (USA, EU, Japan).

However, what is clear today was then an assessment made only by a handful of revolutionary Marxists. For a significant period, the realities and partial successes of globalization constituted a shared ground of interests between U.S. and European imperialists—and, up to a certain point, even with China (roughly until the early 2010s).

During the same period, the European imperialists’ plans for the “completion” of the EU and the pursuit—if not of global hegemony, at least of parity with U.S. imperialism—reached their peak before ultimately collapsing.

Finally, “globalization” was promoted and protected by the military arm of the “New World Order” led by U.S. imperialism and NATO. Thus we witnessed the barbarity and destruction of wars in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—as well as “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian” imperialist interventions and massacres.

 

7. The landmark crisis of 2007–2008[8] and the ensuing “Great Recession” marked the beginning of a reversal in globalization. Throughout the 2010s, we observed growing divergences and even decoupling in the interests, choices, and paths of the imperialist powers, old and new. The main reasons were:

a) The accumulation of contradictions and dead ends for the U.S. and EU imperialists—their failure to resolve the crisis and the gradual exhaustion of the (albeit massive) tools they employed.

b) The emergence and strengthening of serious rivals, foremost China and subsequently other “emerging” countries, who would gradually challenge—and in some areas dethrone—the old imperialists.

Preventing this development was a foundational aim of globalization itself. That the U.S. and EU failed in this has strategic and historical significance. Specifically, as became clear later, China’s response to the crises of 2007–2008 and 2020—relying on massive state investment—was far more effective. These crises were decisive turning points at which China gained ground at the expense of the U.S. and EU, or overtook them—especially in cutting-edge technologies like 5G and 6G telecommunications, AI, big data, green tech, and cloud services.

 

8. The crisis and the start of globalization’s reversal would initially manifest as diverging interests, choices, and trajectories between U.S.–EU imperialists and China. Later, this would evolve into full-on division and fragmentation, with the open outbreak of fierce rivalries. After 2014, Russia would also enter this dynamic.[9] The results:

a) Coordinated and joint management of the economic crisis became increasingly unfeasible—thus the crisis became harder to control.

b) Fragmentation and disintegration of the global market/economy intensified, along with economic “wars,” protectionist measures, and a general rise in economic nationalism: tariffs, national subsidies, restrictions on “competitive” investments, etc.

c) Armed conflicts multiplied, expanded, and intensified.

d) China gained strength; the BRICS emerged and later expanded; these countries increasingly pulled away chunks of global production and markets from U.S. and EU imperialists; their military and political influence also grew.

Moreover, many of these countries:

1.         Became creditors to the U.S. and EU imperialists.

2.         Reversed the mechanism of unequal exchange to their benefit—thanks to higher productivity (especially striking in the case of China).

3.         Developed their own major or even multinational companies that rival those of the U.S. and EU.

4.         Began challenging dollar hegemony through de-dollarization projects and by constructing alternative international systems of banking, trade, and finance.

All of these are unprecedented developments in the 150–200 year history of the capitalist—and later, imperialist—system.

 

9. For all the above reasons, Trump’s moves—the formal cancellation of “globalization,” the imposition of tariffs, and most importantly the “America First” doctrine (essentially meaning “only America”)—do not constitute a temporary policy shift. They represent a deliberate plan and an alternative strategic orientation for U.S. imperialism—or, at the very least, an attempt in that direction.

Before analyzing this plan/strategy more closely, we must first ask: Are we still in the neoliberal era, or have we entered something new?

a) It would be wrong—or at least premature—to speak of the “end of neoliberalism.” Trump’s policy does not shake its core elements: the essence of open class warfare and counterrevolution (economic, social, political, ideological, etc.), which define extreme neoliberalism. These include:

1.         The brutal management of labor instead of any attempt to “integrate” it—cuts to real wages, social spending, living standards[10], education and skills levels; [11] the dismantling of union organization and democratic freedoms;[12] atomization and fragmentation of labor relations and the working class as a whole; a constant drift toward authoritarianism and the “strong state.”

2.         A regime of capital accumulation that gives absolute primacy: on one hand, to the private sector at the expense of public investment/enterprise; on the other, to speculation, finance, and fictitious capital over productive investment.

3.         A regime of vast inequalities: parasitic enrichment and over-enrichment of the elite, coupled with a continuous class-based redistribution against workers and the masses, and the mass spread of poverty and destitution.

The persistence—or rather the intensification—of these elements in Trump’s policies[13] leads to the conclusion that his agenda must be understood as a variation of neoliberalism.

b) However, the changes are also profound. This is not merely a continuation of neoliberalism. What now seems to be emerging is a degeneration of “late” neoliberalism into a hybrid of neoliberalism and protectionism/economic nationalism—or, put differently, a blend of “free market” principles with “despotic state interventions” in the economy.

By “degeneration,” we mean this: Neoliberal policies are not being entirely abandoned—and certainly not softened when it comes to the assault on labor. But they increasingly require a crutch, a complement of a different policy type.

 

10. Through the imposition of tariffs, U.S. imperialism is attempting a generalized, global blackmail—complemented by political-military threats and the looming danger of new wars—in an effort to mitigate or halt its ongoing, if not rapid, economic decline.
The only real alternative currently available to it would be a direct, massive attack on the working class within the U.S. itself, through a drastic reduction of wages. Understandably, before launching such an internal offensive, it seeks to export part of its crisis, to shift the burden onto its global rivals.

In summary, this dismal economic situation—and the even bleaker prospects—of U.S. imperialism can be seen in the following:

a) All forecasts agree that by 2050, at the latest, China will have the largest GDP in the world, followed by the U.S. and then India.

b) In 2024, global GDP shares (based on purchasing power parity) were: China 19.3%, U.S. 14.8%, EU 14.2%. In 1980, the figures were: China 2.1% (!), U.S. 21.6%, EU 27.7%. The U.S. has suffered major setbacks, while the EU has collapsed.[14]

c) In 2023, industrial value-added as a percentage of GDP: China 26.2%, U.S. 10.6%, EU 14.7%.

d) The U.S. trade deficit reached $1.2 trillion, while the current account deficit in 2024 stood at $1.1 trillion (3.9% of GDP).

It is self-evident to Marxists (and increasingly being acknowledged by even bourgeois economists—Keynesians or neoliberals alike) that chronic trade deficits are ultimately caused by a “structural competitiveness deficit,” i.e., a fall in labor productivity. This is indeed the reality facing the U.S. today (even more so for Europe), especially in contrast with China, after decades of undermining productive investments in favor of parasitic profits from the “virtual” economy (stocks, debt, derivatives, etc.).

The contrast with the early days of U.S. imperial hegemony, following World War II and during the postwar long boom (1948–1973), is striking. At that time, U.S. productivity was vastly—astronomically—superior to that of every other country (not to mention the then dependent and agricultural economies, from some of which the BRICS+ giants would later emerge). The American market was thus impenetrable to any competitor—a hegemonic status it held for around 25 years.

e) In 2024, the U.S. budget deficit was $1.8 trillion.

f) At the end of 2024, U.S. public debt stood at $36.2 trillion, up from $19.6 trillion at the end of 2010. As interest rates rise, so too does debt servicing cost: it now accounts for 16% of federal expenditures.

g) The U.S.’s “net international investment position”[15] has collapsed: from a $2.5 trillion surplus in 2010 to a $23.6 trillion deficit in 2024.

h) The global role of the U.S. dollar is steadily declining: dollar reserves dropped from 70% of the global total in 2000 to under 60% by 2020.

These figures also explain U.S. imperialism’s attempt—again through tariff-based blackmail—to impose what has been dubbed the “Mar-a-Lago Agreement”: a devaluation of the dollar aimed at boosting U.S. exports and, more crucially, extending and “wiping out” part of its debt burden.

 

11. While U.S. productive decline, over-indebtedness, and deficits have long been known, the above evidence points to something more:[16]

a) Political, state, and military tools cannot indefinitely compensate for structural economic weakness and decline.
Despite the blackmail tactics of the U.S. imperialist state and the special “privileges” of the dollar and its global economic role, a major question mark now looms: can Trump’s policies continue to secure global financing of U.S. imperialism?

A generalized trade war with the entire world can only lead—sooner or later—to an investment and financial war. This would disrupt capital flows into the U.S. and bring a painful end to its privileged access to international financing—ultimately driving it toward default.

Today, U.S. imperialism and the dollar lack the strength to contain these dangers and are, in fact, deeply exposed. This became evident in Trump’s forced retreat on tariff policy. One factor was China’s strong counteroffensive, which threatened a “blackout” in the supply chains of the U.S. economy. Another was the mass sell-off of U.S. Treasury bonds, which drove borrowing costs sky-high and pushed the U.S. to the brink of immediate insolvency.

Today’s U.S. rivals possess the power to deliver such blows—as shown, for example, by China and Japan dumping large volumes of their U.S. bond holdings.

Such scenarios could trigger the next recession, either within the U.S. or globally. From this perspective, the U.S. economy is even more vulnerable than during the interwar period, as:

1.         U.S. foreign trade (imports/exports) now makes up 15% of its GDP, compared to 6% in 1930.

2.         Retaliatory tariffs could reduce U.S. exports by as much as 35%.

3.         The interwar stock market bubble was fueled solely by U.S. capital, whereas today it depends on global capital inflows.

b) Regardless of whether some manufacturing returns to the U.S., a true industrial renaissance after so many decades is practically impossible—for many reasons.

First, such a transformation would require a genuine “revolution”: a vast share of the goods consumed in the U.S. has long not been produced domestically. This level of change would go against the entire trend of global division of labor. The prerequisites for this appear utterly unrealistic.

Second, it is becoming increasingly clear that the idea of Trump representing some coherent “productive” wing of U.S. imperialism—supposedly in opposition to the “speculators”—was a myth. Quite simply:

·          These two forces are inseparably linked.

·          The champions of speculative capital (e.g., crypto-financiers) back Trump, seeking further deregulation in their favor and profits that once again will not be invested productively, but channeled into the same old speculative practices (e.g., stock buybacks).

An image of the uncertainty and turbulence created can be seen in: Trump’s confrontation with the U.S. central banker (Trump demands interest rate cuts—possibly to cushion recession risk or to stimulate stock speculation); and the historic price spike in gold (for the first time, surpassing $3,500/ounce) as a “safe haven.”

 

12. The very reasons that have made tariffs a seemingly necessary response also reveal their limitations—and in fact, foreshadow upcoming failures and dead ends. An economic renaissance of the U.S. appears impossible, while Trump’s new policy/strategy is far more likely to lead to stronger coordination among BRICS/BRICS+ countries, to an acceleration of de-dollarization efforts, and to the advancement of the “alternative globalization” they advocate.

Lastly, it should be noted: tariffs have historically been an effective and irreplaceable tool for rising capitalist classes to achieve industrial development. But there is no historical precedent of a capitalist class managing to reverse its decline or successfully defend hegemonic status over time through tariffs. [17]This is because true hegemony requires securing the interests of allies and the ability to impose “general solutions for the system as a whole.” That is exactly the opposite of what U.S. imperialism is doing today.[18]

 

13. Internal developments in the U.S. are of major importance for the deepening political crisis and the global trend of authoritarian retreat and “preemptive counterrevolution.”

a) Trump’s rise was not only the result of the strategic failures of U.S. imperialism and the old political “establishment,” but also of the political disintegration within the U.S. bourgeoisie, its apparatuses, and the traditional mechanisms of the two-party system. This trend has been growing since the mid-1990s and goes hand in hand with the strategies of neoliberalism, globalization, and the gradual productive, economic, and social decay of the U.S.

b) Today there is clearly a consolidation of the American ruling class around Trump, and this alignment is not simply temporary. However, there are serious doubts about how cohesive this alignment truly is. Can it unify the top, decisive segments of American capital around a comprehensive strategic plan (one that would require these capitalists to accept potential short-term costs or disruptions, even contrary to immediate profit motives)? Or will this alignment exhaust itself after the first wave of Trump’s victories—especially if failures begin to accumulate?

c) These contradictions are embodied in figures like Elon Musk, who, aside from being a union-busting capitalist, personifies the contradiction of the “active entrepreneur–bourgeois politician.” Traditionally, outside of exceptional moments, the ruling class preferred to leave political representation to professionals while it focused on business. The increasingly blurred line between these roles today risks turning all political strategy into a clientelist and personalized affair. This is especially dangerous given the scale of planning required in the confrontation with China.

d) Managing these contradictions—especially the inevitable attack on the working class (and any militant response to it)—requires a harsher regime of state and political authoritarianism: intensification of repression, a permanent State of Emergency, and rule under a “strongman.” This is what Trump is pursuing: purging the “deep state,” subordinating legislative authority to the executive, ruling by presidential decree, altering judicial and electoral systems, mass deportations, attacking the radicalization of youth, and seeking ways to bypass the Constitution to pursue a third presidential term.

 

14. In Ukraine, U.S. imperialism appeared willing to accept proposals that aligned with the core demands of Russian imperialism[19]—essentially acknowledging a victory Russia had already secured on the ground. The fact that such a settlement, which seemed imminent, did not materialize and the conflict continues indefinitely shows just how difficult it is to establish even temporary equilibrium under current conditions.

Meanwhile, the semi-fascist regime in Kyiv and the criminal Zelensky are trapped, unlikely to be saved despite clinging to European imperialists and pushing maximalist, unrealistic demands. They can only “run down the clock,” postpone the inevitable, and try to save themselves at the expense of the Ukrainian people. The most likely outcome is a broader Russian victory.

Russian imperialism, for its part, will not back down on anything substantial—nor is it in a hurry. It has clear goals and “red lines,” and it is overwhelmingly dominant on the battlefield. As even Western military analysts have recently admitted, although the war has imposed a massive cost on Russia, it has responded with adaptability and resilience. The war experience has improved its military capacity—e.g., with the large spring mobilization.

Even more so:

a) Building on this victory, Russian imperialism is expanding its international footprint and influence. For example, it is establishing a military presence in Africa’s Sahel (from which French imperialism was recently ousted), Southeast Asia, and the Pacific (e.g., proposed naval base in Indonesia to monitor U.S. and allied installations and counter the encirclement of China), summits with the Arab League, and more.

b) Russia’s negotiations with the U.S. are not limited to Ukraine—they involve energy, industrial cooperation, and broader issues. These plans are extremely difficult to implement, as they would imply a long-term equilibrium between U.S. and Russian imperialism[20]—something nearly inconceivable. Nevertheless, under Trump’s new policy direction, U.S. imperialism appears willing to test these waters—and a return to previous policies seems unlikely in the near future.

 

15. European imperialists are in a dramatic situation. Recession, deindustrialization, and mass layoffs—especially in Germany—raise the risk of a rapid collapse in their global standing. The same structural crisis affects the entire continent. Europe has fallen far behind China and now lacks any meaningful response to the aggressive strategies of U.S. imperialism—let alone a common one. The U.S.-China trade war will also hit European companies hard.

The shift toward “military Keynesianism” and a war-driven economy is becoming mandatory—posing a deadly threat to living standards, democratic freedoms, and the very survival of Europe’s working masses. But it will not reverse Europe’s historic decline. At best, it will allow each imperialist power to bargain individually for a better place in the global order—among giants like the U.S., China, and Russia.[21]

The defeat in Ukraine and the ongoing crises are likely to intensify centrifugal forces within the EU, whose “unity” is already under strain. A gradual disintegration of the EU cannot be ruled out. Similarly, under Trump’s new political strategy, NATO’s role as a collective defense for European imperialists may also begin to erode.

Europe’s stance on Ukraine is both laughable and dangerous. With U.S. protection retreating, the European powers stand like mangy hyenas, unable to intervene meaningfully, as all their “coalition of the willing” plans for a strong presence in Ukraine remain in limbo. Yet they continue to exhibit arrogance and detachment, backing a finished figure like Zelensky to the bitter end and shouting about war with Russia “until 2029”—as if they’ve lost all historical perspective, balance, and strategic clarity in the maelstrom.

There is growing concern that they may risk a reckless adventure against Russia—with catastrophic consequences for Europe’s peoples.
The rise of the AfD in Germany and its path toward becoming the leading political force would complete the far right’s consolidation across Europe—despite desperate efforts by the “extreme center” (e.g., Macron, Scholz, von der Leyen) to retain control (see Le Pen’s legal troubles to block her presidential bid).

All bourgeois political forces—traditional, centrist, far-right—are in ongoing crisis, delegitimization, or disintegration. While the far right is gaining ground for now, it cannot offer a coherent alternative—as even Trump’s tariffs demonstrate.

And the historical conditions no longer favor nationalist and militarist offensives like those of the World Wars. The far right’s limits will become visible soon enough, even if it continues exploiting mass confusion and disorientation.

With the defeat in Ukraine, European imperialists are facing a massive cost they are politically and materially unequipped to manage. This represents:

·          A terrifying danger for Europe’s workers and peoples—to be dragged into barbarism;

·          But also a historic opportunity for social uprisings, revolutionary events, and the reemergence of a combative revolutionary Left.

 

16. The collapse of the ideology of “free trade” and “globalization” (within a context of worsening crisis, authoritarian regression, looming war, and mass rejection of the bourgeois elite) could open a pathway for the theoretical and ideological resurgence of the workers’ movement—deepening the critique of capitalism, revitalizing Marxist theory, and advancing socialist-communist ideology.

But for this to happen, a revolutionary Left must exist—one that takes on the titanic task of politically equipping the working class, new vanguards, militant activists, and the coming social and revolutionary upheavals.

 

 

(B) Economic and Political Situation in Greece 

17. The government’s supposed “successes” (e.g., tackling tax evasion) are in fact the flip side of the wretched state of the Greek economy and the ongoing impoverishment of the working class and popular masses.

a) The primary budget surplus more than doubled from €4.6 billion in 2023 to €11.4 billion in 2024.

– Half of this surge is due to increased tax revenues (nearly €6 billion)[22], which means intensified tax exploitation of workers, the poor, and the “middle class,” as well as revenues from privatizations—the sale of public assets (nearly €2.5 billion).

– The other half stems from cuts in both consumer and productive spending. In Q1 2025, spending cuts amounted to €2.2 billion—causing rapid deterioration in hospitals, schools, universities, and social services.
This monstrous surplus reflects an economy that is “devouring its own flesh.” It amounts to parasitic enrichment of capital and the elite, draining the economy, shrinking social services and investment, and ensuring long-term decay.

b) Greece has the highest proportion of low-income pensioners in the Eurozone. The average main pension has fallen below the minimum wage (€840 gross). 56% of pensioners receive up to €940 (net), while 37% survive on just €658.

c) Unemployment remains high, with around 1 million registered unemployed—nearly half of whom are long-term unemployed. Only 18% receive any benefits, and even that number is steadily decreasing.
d) Wage share in GDP dropped to 35% in 2024—far below the EU average (47.9%) and Eurozone (48.5%). This 35% figure takes us back to 1973 levels or earlier—at the end of Greece’s post–civil war reconstruction era.

Finally, the €25–30 billion allocated to arms procurement by the end of the decade constitutes perhaps the largest such program since the fall of the junta—and will be a death blow to public health, education, and social insurance spending.

 

18. The actions of the Mitsotakis government point in two directions: first, toward possible elections; second, toward a generalized counteroffensive.

It offers laughable “benefits” and fake wage hikes; covers up the Tempi railway disaster; escalates “law and order” policies: attacks on squats, riot police raids on campuses, pogroms against youth (e.g., “reform labor” schools for “bad students”), repression of workers, reinstating mass student expulsions, and reviving the “two extremes” theory targeting the Left (e.g., over the Marfin tragedy, May 2010).
Despite its dire situation and widespread delegitimization, it will try to exploit the comical collapse of the so-called “progressive” opposition.

 

19. Recently, beyond the Tempi disaster, the government—especially the Mitsotakis faction—has suffered internal blows from within its own ruling bloc and allies:

– Heavy losses in union elections, even in traditionally conservative strongholds (e.g., chambers of commerce, hospital doctors).

– A rift with parts of the business elite (e.g., the Marinakis media empire).

– Outright corruption, rot, and immorality oozing from all state and party institutions, poisoning everyday life.

– Friction with parts of the military and judiciary, some of whom feel threatened or disrespected.

 

20. These developments are not limited to the government, ND, or Mitsotakis’s future. They reveal the depth of the political crisis—which will not subside soon, given the fragmentation and farcical state of all bourgeois parties.

Before any “stability” is achieved, we are likely to see much more turbulent developments.
This is also the broader crisis engulfing Greek capitalism: the ruling class is increasingly unable to maintain control—ideologically, politically, organizationally, and socially.

This crisis becomes “existential” in light of Trump’s U.S. policy shift.
Greek capitalism, trying to straddle both the EU and U.S. imperialisms, is now caught in midair. It is nearly impossible to chart a course in such conditions—especially for a ruling elite unwilling to question either power bloc.

Thus, with leaders like Mitsotakis or any “successor,” Greek capitalism will only stumble blindly toward the next major crisis—reduced to a supplicant of whichever “strong” power dominates the region.

 

21. This dynamic also defines Greece’s stance toward Turkish sub-imperialism, which—despite tensions—pursues a clear strategy (shared by both Erdoğan and the secular Kemalists, falsely portrayed by Greek media as “democrats”).

Turkey negotiates on multiple fronts,[23] has significantly strengthened its position, and may gain even more leverage following the U.S. policy pivot.

Despite rhetorical bravado or grand ambitions, Greek capitalism will likely be forced into retreat—most notably through “joint exploitation” (of the Aegean, etc.).

Weapons purchases, sycophantic support for Zionist butchers in Israel, and similar efforts will not shield Greece from this outcome.

The abandonment of the 15-year-long energy interconnection plan with Cyprus and Israel underscores the real power dynamics in the region.[24]

(C) Labor Movement – The Left

 22. The February 28, 2025 demonstrations—by hundreds of thousands of workers, youth, and ordinary people, possibly over 1 million in Athens and 2 million nationwide and abroad (in 300 towns and 100 cities in 45 countries!)—have left a deep mark on Greek political history and public consciousness.

These mass protests over the Tempi crime, alongside a General Strike that even the GSEE bureaucracy was forced to support, are triggering tectonic shifts in Greek society, politics, and institutions.
Regardless of how fast or slow events unfold, one thing is certain: something new is being born. It’s still unformed, but soon it will take shape—and it will be explosive, at the very least.

These developments are fueled—at least in part—by global trends: deepening crises, geopolitical chaos, economic warfare, and political-military clashes.

 

23. Fifty years after the fall of the dictatorship (1974) and fifteen since the memoranda (2010), Greek capitalism, its political system, and its serving parties are in crisis. A new historic turning point is upon us.

The massive uprisings, with slogans like “I can’t breathe” and “No peace without justice,” reveal a widespread unwillingness to accept any solution coming from the establishment—whether government or opposition.
Mitsotakis’s pathetic cabinet reshuffle aimed at deflecting blame only highlighted his weakness.

Neither parliamentary maneuvers like investigative committees (fully supported by the opposition) seem to impress the people.

This is vital: no parliamentary party can express the popular will for radical change that erupted on February 28.

 

24. Though everything seems to be moving faster today, history is not linear. It unfolds through ruptures, leaps, pauses, regressions—often dramatic ones.
The Greek workers’ movement has experienced all of these phases. No outcome is predetermined.

If this new social struggle ends in defeat, as did the 2010–2012 “indignant” movement, we may enter a period of historic barbarism worse than the post–civil war era.

But by learning from history and struggle—past and present—workers, youth, the poor, and a revolutionary vanguard can win.
Only through a revolutionary program and a revolutionary Left.

Any compromise—like SYRIZA’s during the memoranda—whether adopted by the masses or sections of the radical left, would be disastrous in today’s context of global instability and rapid alternation between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary dynamics.

 

25. This points to the core problem of the radical and far left (now in deep crisis):

Beyond ignorance, confused “analyses,” and lack of respect for the consciousness and development rhythm of the masses, [25]many groups display indifference to unifying struggles and organizing the class, sectarianism, opportunism, etc.

They lack the courage and capacity to think beyond their daily routines, failing to respond to the monumental changes in mass sentiment.

As a result:

a) They recycle dead-end electoral illusions;

b) They lose sight of the central political confrontation with the regime— and retreat into illusions that trade-union or movement “normalcy” can suffice in these explosive times.